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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to decide the question
certified by the Federal District Court pursuant to the
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(1)(Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
The issue presented by the certified question is
whether the Board of County Commissioners of Carbon County has
the authority to discharge an assistant of the County Sheriff
who was appointed by the Sheriff with the approval of the
Commissioner.

As this is an original proceeding in this Court,

there is no prior decision of which review is sought.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Ann. § 17-16-7 (Rep.Vol. 2B 1987), is the
only statute which requires interpretation to determine the
question certified.

That statute, as it existed during the

time at issue in this matter, provided as follows:
Every county, precinct or district officer,
except a county commissioner or a judicial
officer, may, by and with the consent of the
board of county commissioners, appoint as
many deputies and assistants as may be
necessary for the prompt and faithful
discharge of the duties of his office; but
the board shall allow the clerk of the
district court and circuit court in those
counties where the county clerk serves both
courts, such deputies and assistants to
transact the business pertaining to the
district courts and circuit courts as may be
deemed necessary and advisable by the judge
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or judges of the district and circuit
court. The appointment of a deputy must be
made in writing and filed in the office of
the county clerk. Until such appointment is
so made and filed and until such deputy
shall have taken the oath of office, no one
shall be or act as such deputy. Any officer
appointing any deputy shall be liable for
all official acts of such deputy.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The certified question arises in the context of a
civil rights action filed by Tina McCourt pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, wherein she has alleged her constructive discharge from
employment with the Carbon County Sheriff's Office, effected by
the County's Board of Commissioners, constituted a deprivation
of property without due process.

In considering the issues

raised by that claim, Judge Jenkins has sought the guidance of
this Court in determining whether, as a matter of state law,
the Board of County Commissions has the authority to dismiss an
assistant of another elected county officer.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The only facts necessary to this Court's response to
the certified question are as follows:
1 ••-..•• Tina McCourt was hired by Carbon County Sheriff
Barry Bryner, with the approval of the Board of County
Commissioners, in June of 1987 to serve as a dispatcher in the
Sheriff's Office.

(R. Vol. I, Tab 55, p. 8.)
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2.

On November 23, 1987, the Board of Commissioners

purported to terminate Ms. McCourt's employment with the
Sheriff. (R. at Vol. I, Tab 1, p. 2.)
The additional factual assertions contained in
petitioner's brief are irrelevant to the question presented,
which involves only a determination of the statutory powers of
the County Commissioners, not the factual background against
which those powers are exercised.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
This Court has repeatedly held that the Board of
County Commissioners has no authority to suspend or dismiss an
employee appointed by the duly elected County Sheriff with the
approval of the Commissioners.

The right to dismiss flows from

the right to appoint and can only be exercised by the officer
empowered by statute to appoint assistants.

As the statute

which authorized county officers to employ deputies and
assistants expressly denies such power to county commissioners,
it is manifest that the absence of the power to appoint equates
to the absence of the power to dismiss.
ARGUMENT
ONLY THE SHERIFF CAN DISMISS INDIVIDUALS APPOINTED BY
THE SHERIFF WITH THE APPROVAL OF THE BOARD OF COUNTY
COMMISSIONERS
The question certified by the United States District
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Court has, in fact, been previously answered by this Court on
three separate occasions.

In Sheriff of Salt Lake County v.

Board of Commissioners, 71 Utah 593, 268 p. 783 (1928), this
Court noted that the office of county sheriff is an elective
office, like that of county commissioner, and that in the
discharge of his duties the sheriff acts independently of the
commissioners, and not under their control, except as otherwise
specified by state statute. As the law authorizes a sheriff to
appoint deputies or assistants, with approval of the
commissioners,
whatever summary power of suspension or
removal of a deputy may be exercised is to
be exercised by the sheriff and not by the
board of county commissioners . . .
268 p. at 785.
This Court went on to note that the Board of
Commissioners can reduce the number of positions the sheriff
can fill by appointment, but cannot designate which individual
will be removed as a result of a reduction in the size of the
sheriffs approved staff.

If the number of approved

appointments is reduced
then we think it would be within the
province of the sheriff to indicate which of
his deputies were to be retained and which
dismissed . . .
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268 P. at 785. Without deciding what the exact range of
options may be for removing an officer or his appointees, this
Court indicated that it
is enough to now decide, as we do, that the
board of county commissioners have no power
to summarily suspend or remove the
[sheriff's] deputies . . .
268 P. at 786.
This holding was reaffirmed in Fowler v. Gillman, 76
Utah 414, 290 P. 358 (1930), and Hutchinson v. Cartwright, 692
P.2d 772 (Utah 1984).
The petitioner's suggestion that "Carbon County" has
specific authority to appoint personnel (Brief of Petitioner at
p. 14), is, while accurate, wholly unresponsive to the issue
presented by the certified question.

It presumes,

inaccurately, that the power of the County and its Board of
Commissioners are equivalent.

The presumption is not only

erroneous, in the context of the County's employment practices
it is directly contrary to the very statute which authorizes
the County to hire employees other than officers.

It is

somewhat disingenuous to argue, as petitioner's do, that the
Commissioners have an "implied" right to hire, and therefore
fire, any county employee when the very statute they cite as
support for such implicit authority says that all county
officers except commissioners and judicial officers can appoint
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deputies and assistants.

Utah Code Ann. § 17-16-7 permits the

County to hire employees appointed by its officers other than
the commissioners.

The commissioners cannot appoint assistants

for themselves or any other officer.

Accordingly, they cannot

fire the assistants of other officers.

As expressly noted by

this Court in Hutchinson v. Cartwright, 692 P.2d 772, 773 (Utah
1984), "the power to suspend or dismiss is appurtenant to the
power to appoint."
As the Commissioners are expressly exempted from the
class of county officers who have the power to appoint
assistants, no great powers of deduction are required to
conclude they also lack the power to dismiss such assistants.
In an effort to avoid this Court's precise holding in
Sheriff of Salt Lake County, supra, the petitioners suggest
that it was somehow modified by Fowler v. Gillman, supra.

The

argument advanced is that although Fowler explicitly holds that
the Board of County Commissioners cannot "dismiss" individuals
appointed by the sheriff by taking actions to see to it that
they are not paid (which is precisely what was done in this
case), there is "dicta" in the opinion implying that the
Commissioners can do so if they are convinced the appointed
individual is a "bad" employee.

To support this argument

petitioners draw attention to language in the opinion which
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says that an individual appointed in conformity with the
statute, Utah Code Ann. § 17-16-7, is appointed for the term of
the appointing officer unless his earlier dismissal is
warranted for good cause.

(See Brief of Petitioner at p. 18.)

The petitioners then make a leap of faith and assert that such
language means that the Commissioners can dismiss an appointee
for cause prior to the expiration of the sheriffs term.
leap is illogical.

This

It is obviously the appointing officer who

has the authority to effect such a dismissal for cause prior to
the expiration of his term of office.

Not surprisingly, that

is exactly what this Court indicated in Hutchinson, supra, when
it noted that the very language in Fowler quoted by the
petitioners in this case meant that the "sheriff may dismiss a
deputy where the deputy 'has been guilty of misconduct . . .'"
692 P.2d at 773 (emphasis added).
In short, there is no statutory authority empowering
the Board of Commissioners to dismiss an assistant appointed by
the County Sheriff and this Court has held on three separate
occasions that it is the Sheriff, and the Sheriff alone, who
has such authority to act on behalf of the County.
Just as the Sheriff, an elected officer of the County,
could not fire an assistant appointed by the County Clerk or
Treasurer, no matter how convinced he was of that person's
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incompetence or immoral behavior, so too the Commissioners
cannot exercise authority in excess of their delegated powers.
A sheriff cannot lawfully interfere with the commissioners in
the discharge of their duties even if the sheriff knows for a
fact of their incompetence.

The same is true of the

commissioners in relation to the sheriff.

Disputes about the

quality of service of elected county officials are resolved at
the ballot box or through the statutorily prescribed removal
procedures.

They cannot be resolved by Commission fiat, no

matter how sincerely the Commissioners believe that their cause
is just.
The petitioners repeatedly stress that Ms. McCourt was
an "unsworn" appointee of the Sheriff.
significance.

This is of no

The same statute governs the appointment of

deputies and assistants and petitioners cite no authority
suggesting any basis for differentiating between these types of
employees when determining who has the authority to suspend or
discipline appointees.
The entire basis for the petitioner's actions in this
matter was their personal belief that the Sheriff of Carbon
County was doing a bad job and conducting himself improperly.
There is no question that county commissioners lack the
authority to "fire" the duly elected Sheriff.

See Argyle v.
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Wright, 63 Utah 184, 224 P. 649 (1924).

The procedure for

involuntary removal of a county officer is statutory.
Code Ann. § 77-6-1 et se£.

See Utah

(Rep.Vol. 8B 1990.)

If the Commissioners deemed the Sheriffs malfeasance
to warrant his removal, they should have followed this
procedure.

Having failed to do so, they lacked any authority

to interfere with the Sheriff's discharge of his duties.
While petitioners have asserted that one of the
sources of their "implied" power to discharge a Sheriff's
office employee stems from their statutory right to supervise
other county officers, as set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 17-5-19
(Rep.Vol. 2B 1987), this section has been held not to grant the
Commissioners any responsibility over assistants or deputies of
other county officers.

In Smith v. Hill, 510 F.Supp. 767

(D. Utah 1981), it was held that this section gives the
Commissioners
discretion to supervise the conduct of a
county [officer], but not his deputy.
Apparently, the person solely responsible
for the supervision of a deputy is the
[county officer] himself.
510 F.Supp. at 776.
Since the time of statehood, it has been recognized
that county commissioners "can exercise such powers only as are
expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon them by
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the statutes . . . "

Carbon County v. Hamilton, 48 Utah 503,

160 P. 765, 768 (1916).

Petitioner's argument of "necessary

implication" is that if they did not act to supervise the
Sheriff's assistants the County would be without power to do
so.

This argument ignores the obvious.

The County has the

power to supervise the Sheriff's employees.

It exercises that

power through the Sheriff, and the Sheriff alone.

Accordingly,

the Board of Commissioner's attempt to usurp this authority is
unlawful and the question certified should be answered in the
negative.
CONCLUSION
Stripped of its unnecessary factual baggage, the
simple question presented in this matter is whether the Board
of County Commissioners of Carbon County can fire an employee
of the Sheriff's Office if they firmly believe such action
should be taken and the Sheriff disagrees.
simple:

no.

The answer is

Both the Commissioners and the Sheriff are

elected county officers, who function largely independently of
each other, with powers and duties set forth by statute. A
Sheriff is authorized to hire assistants, with the approval of
the Commissioners, and having so hired an employee only the
Sheriff can fire that employee.

This Court has so held on

three separate occasions.
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The answer does not change because the Sheriff is felt
to be "incompetent" or is thought to be having, or is having, a
romantic relationship with his assistant.

The powers and

duties of county officers do not vary depending upon the
quality of performance or "moral" character of the office
holder•

If an officer's conduct warrants removal, there is a

statutory procedure to achieve that end.

If his performance is

thought to be adverse to the interests of good government, then
the electorate will have its say.

These are the recognized

means for resolving disputes about who is, or is not, doing a
good job in county government.

Such disputes cannot be

properly resolved by having one group of officers usurp the
authority properly exercised by another.
The certified question should be answered in the
negative and the matter referred back to Federal District Court.
DATED this Jy&

day of CTLU^Z.

, 1991.

PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER

By ^
4 ^ ^ ^ ^
M. Dafvid E c k e r s l e y
<£?
A t t o r r i e y s f o r T i n a McCourt
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U.S. DISTRICT COURT

IN T H E UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION
* * * * * * * *

TINA McCOURT,
Plaintiff,
CERTIFICATION ORDER

vs.
LEE SEMKEN, GUIDO RACHIELE,
and WILLIAM KROMPEL, individually, and in their official
capacity as the Board of Commissioners of Carbon County,
CARBON COUNTY, and NORMAN
PRICHARD, in his official
capacity as Clerk of Carbon
County,

Civil N o . 87C-1052J

Defendant.
* * * * * * * *

TO T H E SUPREME COURT OF T H E STATE OF UTAH:
The

Honorable

Bruce

United States District Court

S. Jenkins,

Chief

Judge

for the District of Utah,

of the
pursuant

to Rule 41 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, hereby certifies

the following

question

of law to be answered

Supreme Court:
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

by the Utah

Do Utah Boards of County Commissioners have
authority to discharge a probationary nondeputy (non-sworn) subordinate employee working in the County Sheriff's office, when:
(1) The subordinate performed dispatching services
in support
of the County
Sheriff's law enforcement duties and in
support of various services offered by the
County and certain municipalities over which
the County Sheriff had no responsibility.
(2) The County
was satisfied with
performance.

Sheriff stated that he
the subordinate's work

(3) The subordinate nevertheless was not
competent to discharge her duties, and her
actions and omissions constituted a threat to
the safety of the citizens of the county and
the Commission believed her actions created
risks of liability to the county.
(4) The County Sheriff (a) generally was
not competent to discharge his duties, (b)
had a romantic and sexual relationship with
the subordinate though he was married to
another woman, (c) was not honest with County
and State officials regarding his personal
relationship with the subordinate, and (d)
refused to take action to terminate the
employment of the subordinate or otherwise
take action to remove the risks created by
her acts and omissions.
Pursuant to Rule 41(c)(l)(i)(ii) and (iii), the undersigned

represents that the certified question

is a controlling

issue of law in a proceeding pending before this Court and there
appears to be no controlling Utah law.
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STATEMENT OF UNCONTROVERTED FACTS
1.

Plaintiff Tina McCourtf a probationary employee of

Carbon County who was working as a dispatcher/secretary in the
Carbon County Sheriff's office, was terminated in the latter part
of 1987 by the defendant Board of Commissioners of Carbon County
for failure to competently discharge her duties as dispatcher.
The Commission did so because her acts and omissions created
risks to the safety of the citizens of Carbon County and created
attendant risks of liability to the County.

(Affidavit of Lee

Semken, 1M 6,7.)
2.

The County Sheriff stated that he was satisfied

with her work performance and refused to discharge her. (Affidavit of Barry Bryner, 1 4).
3.

The Carbon County Commission discharged plaintiff

because of the Sheriff's refusal to do so.

(Complaint herein,

11 9).
4.

During the period that Tina McCourt was employed,

roughly June to December, 1988, dispatchers located in the Carbon
County Sheriff's office provided dispatching services for Carbon
County as a whole and for a number of municipalities over which
the Sheriff of Carbon County had no jurisdiction.
providing

dispatching

services

for

the

In addition to

Sheriff's

vehicles,

dispatchers provided dispatching services for the Carbon County
ambulance

which

was

under

the

jurisdiction

of
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the

County

Commission, the East Carbon ambulance, the Carbon County communications

(audio) and TV trucks, both of which were under the

jurisdiction

of

the County

Commission,

a rescue

unit

called

Rescue 1 which was owned at the time by Carbon County and which
was under the jurisdiction of the County Commission (although it
may have been disbanded before plaintiff was employed), a rescue
unit called Rescue 3 which was under the jurisdiction of Helper
City, the Carbon County Mental Health Department which was not
under the jurisdiction of the County Sheriff, the City of East
Carbon, the Price City Police Department, the Wellington City
Police Department, the Price City Fire Department, the Wellington
City Fire Department, and the Helper City Fire Department. (Depo.
of Jerry Cowan, the Chief Deputy Sheriff of Carbon County, pp.
19-26).

The dispatcher also provided dispatching services for

the County's animal control service which was not under the
control of the County Sheriff (Deposition of Barbara Kelly, p.
13).
5.

The uncontroverted facts in the record relating to

plaintiff's job performance are the following:
(a) Deputy Sheriff Jerry Cowan, Tina McCourt's
superior, worked with her daily on the same shift during the five
or six months McCourt was employed in the Sheriff's office and
observed her daily in the discharge of her duties as dispatcher
(Cowan Depo., pp. 27-28).

He was asked the questions:
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Q.

Over that time [June to December 1987]
did you form an opinion based in your
capacity as her supervisor as chief
deputy of the sheriff of Carbon County
whether she was discharging her duties
in a competent fashion?

A.

Yes.

Q.

What's your opinion?

A.

She did not. She had a longer training
period than any other dispatcher.
By
that I mean as she was sitting at a
dispatch
console,
another
back-up
dispatcher was there to help or advise
on what to do as far as paging the
computer, that type of thing.
She
didn't seem to grasp it quickly enough,
nor did she seem to have the desire for
the job.
She is the only dispatcher
that I ever watched get up and leave
that console, leave the dispatch room
and mosey up and down the hallway.

Q.

And
leave
unattended?

A.

Open, yeah.

the

dispatching

phone

(Cowan depo., p. 28).
(b)

A call came in to plaintiff when she was on

duty reporting vandalism and it took Tina McCourt two hours to
dispatch a vehicle.

This lapse of time was unacceptable accord-

ing to both McCourt's immediate dispatching supervisor, Barbara
Kelly, and her more senior superior, Chief Deputy Cowan. (Depo.
of Barbara Kelly, pp. 22-23, and Cowan Depo., p. 36 and Cowan Ex.
2).
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(c)

She took ten minutes to dispatch a fire truck

when she was required to dispatch it in seconds.

The fire unit

is prepared to leave within one and one-half to two minutes after
receiving a call from the dispatcher.
unit arrived
Tina

In this instance the fire

in about 14 minutes after the call was placed to

from the complainant.

It took McCourt

two and

one-half

times longer to place the call to the fire unit than it did for
the fire unit to receive the call, leave its facility and arrive
on the scene.

(Depo. of Barbara Kelly, p. 19, Cowan Depo., pp.

37-38 and Cowan Ex. 3 ) .
(d)

Tina McCourt

received

a teletype

from

an

out-of-state police department requesting assistance in locating
an overdue motorist
County.

A

due

vehicle

in the

City

description,

passenger's name were given.

the

of Wellington
driver's

in Carbon

name

and

a

McCourt did nothing at all and the

teletype was not noticed until the next dispatcher came on duty.
According

to Chief

information

Deputy

Cowan,

she

should

have

given

to the Wellington City officer as well

this

as to all

County units in an attempt to locate the vehicle and individuals.
The dispatcher who arrived
appropriate action.
(e)

following McCourt1s

took the

(Cowan Depo., pp. 39-40 and Cowan Ex. 4 ) .
Tina McCourt

received a call of a personal

injury near East Carbon County.
from Price.

shift

East Carbon

is 30 miles away

Rather than dispatching the East Carbon ambulance,
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she incorrectly dispatched the ambulance from the City of Price,
(Cowan Depo.f pp. 41-42 and Cowan Ex. 5).
(f)

If the four specific incidents referred to

above had not occurred, Chief Deputy Cowan's opinion of her poor
job performance would not have changed. (Cowan Depo.f p. 42).
(g) Tina McCourt's immediate supervisor, Barbara
M. Kelly, who was in charge of all dispatchers, was never consulted by the Sheriff when McCourt was hired (Kelly Depo., pp.
15-16).

Following McCourt's employment, Mrs. Kelly believed that

Tina McCourt did not discharge her duties properly.

Patrolmen

complained to Mrs. Kelly that Tina McCourt would not do security
checks on them after they had been out of their vehicle five or
six minutes.
6.

(Kelly Depo., p. 30).
After Mrs. Kelly wrote out a poor evaluation of

McCourt's work performance

(Exhibit

1 to Cowan's deposition)

Kelly was demoted by the Sheriff from her supervisory position
(Kelly Depo., p. 25); the Sheriff put her on three different
shifts a week (two graveyards, two afternoons and one day) with
the shifts rotated all the time (Id. at 33); she received phone
calls in which she was told she would lose her job if she testified against McCourt [in a January, 1988 state court proceeding];
and a vehicle attempted to run her off the road (Kelly Depo., pp.
33-34).
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7.

Tina McCourt, who was 19 years old (McCourt Depo.f

p. 3) # had a romantic and sexual relationship with the Sheriff of
Carbon County (a married man of 40), during the period she was
employed in the dispatcher's office.

She became pregnant with

the Sheriff's child, (Depo. of Informant No. 4, pp. 24-25).

As

early as July, 1987, one month after she was hired as dispatcher,
she was fearful that she was pregnant with the Sheriff's child.
(Informant No. 4 Depo.f p. 36).
8.

She traveled overnight with the Sheriff to Kane

County, Salt Lake City, Park City, and Vernal.

She went to some

of these places with the Sheriff more than once.
Informant No. 4, pp. 11-28).

(Depo. of

She spent two or three nights in

the same bedroom with Sheriff Bryner at the home of Sheriff
Gonzales of Kane County. (Depo. of Joseph T. Gonzales, pp. 7-8).
9.

After

she

was

employed

as dispatcher,

Sheriff

Bryner unilaterally designated her as his personal secretary.
(Although the Carbon County Commission had only approved her as
dispatcher.

See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for

Summary Judgment,

Statement of Undisputed Facts, 11 2).

She

would frequently spend long periods locked up with the Sheriff in
his office over the period of her five or six months employment.
The Chief Deputy never saw any evidence that she had performed
any secretarial duties during the time she spent alone with the
Sheriff. (Cowan Depo., pp. 44-45).

Over the five to six month
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period she typed perhaps a total of four letters for the Sheriff
and she opened his mail.

These were the only duties she per-

formed of a secretarial nature for the Sheriff.

(Cowan Depo., p.

45).
10.

The

emergency services.

dispatcher

provides

the

public's

access

to

Tina McCourt's conduct raised the risk in

the minds of the Commission

and the Deputy Sheriff

that those

emergency services would be denied to the public when needed and
Sheriff Bryner would not do anything to correct these risks even
though he received complaints about Tina McCourt's performance.
(Cowan Depo., pp. 31-32; Affidavit of Lee Semken).
11.

Plaintiff

was

discharged

by

the

Carbon

County

Commission on November 23r 1987. (Affidavit of Lee Semken, 11 7 ) .
12.
Court Judge

On January 5, 1988, Judge Boyd Bunnell, District
for the Seventh Judicial District Court of Carbon

County, State of Utah, granted an ex parte temporary restraining
order

against

plaintiff,

restraining

her

from

entering

the

Sheriff's dispatch center and operating or otherwise handling the
dispatch

equipment

Price, Utah.

of

the

(A certified

Carbon

County

copy of

Sheriff's

the temporary

office

in

restraining

order is attached to Notice of Filing of Certain Pleadings from
Related State Court Action).
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13.
of

On February 1, 1988, Chief Judge Bruce S. Jenkins

the United States District

Court

for the District

of Utah

denied plaintiff McCourt's motion for preliminary injunction.
14.

From March 8 to March 11, 1988, a special audit

team created by the Commissioner of the Utah State Department of
Public Safety conducted an investigation of 14 separate allegations made by the Carbon County Commission against the Sheriff of
Carbon County and also investigated the Sheriff's allegation that
the Carbon County Commission was interfering with the discharge
of his duties.

The audit

team was composed

of Clyde Palmer,

Director, Utah Peace Officers Standards and Training which acted
as the Chairman of the audit team, Sheriff Bob Limb, Box Elder
County Sheriff's Office, representative from the Utah Sheriff's
Association,

and

Sharon

Esplin,

a

special

investigator,

Utah

Attorney General's Office.

The audit team interviewed some 30

witnesses

and

in Carbon

County

later

issued

a written

report

entitled "Final Report Fact Finding Audit", a copy of which is
attached as Exhibit B to the Affidavit of Sharon Esplin.

On its

last page, the report concludes, second to last paragraph:
To put it simply and succinctly the Sheriff
does not have the present capability to
manage his operation and those deficiencies
have been exacerbated by Commission actions
which have, with some justification, intruded
upon the traditional prerogatives of an
independently elected official.
(
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The audit team also concluded on the seventh unnumbered page of
its report, under FINDINGS, that the Carbon County Sheriff was
not

truthful about

certain out-of-office

contacts he had with

plaintiff Tina McCourt.
•

This

Certified

docketing s h e e t in t h i s
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Order
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*

accompanied by a copy of

the

case.
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BY THE COURT:

M. David Eckersley, Esq.
Daniel M. Allred, Esq.
HONdRABLEy^RUCk S. JENKINS
DGE
DISTRICT/COURT
The parties

by their

respectivecounsel

foregoing order as to form and content.

M. David Eckersley^^'
PRINCE, YEATES & GELDZAHLER
Attorneys for Plaintiff

irriel M.' Allred^
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Defendant
Carbon County
220-.101389A
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DC-111S (7/85)

~i

A jLixrv

1/87

1 t b COMPLAINT filed, assigned t o the Honorable Judge Bruce Jenkins.

/87ntw 2
3
f87ni* 4
8 id 5

88nvl

x*\^-w»>-^w*»-.

PLTF's Mot/Prelim Inj
PLTF's Memo In Suppt of Mot/Prelim Inj

(

NOTICE of Hrg on Mot/Prelim Inj set for 2/1/88 at 8:30 A.M. cc: attys
Cams Before Crt for Mot for Pre/Inj. Arguments of cnsl heard re who is authorized
to terminate employee. The Crt DENIED the mot, suggesting that cnsl, if interested,!
fornulate the question relative to "pcwer" for the State Supreme Court's consideration,
and this Crt will then review the matter. Cnsl have one week in which to do it.

1
6 DEFS Memo In Suppt of Mot/Dism

7 DEFS' Mono In Oppos to Pltfs Mot/Prelim Inj
8 DEFS1 Cert of Svc of Doc #6-7
r

88n*J

9

NOTICE OF Hrg on settlemt of from of Order of Reference to State Supreme Court
set for 5/20/88 @10:30 A.M. cc: attys

1/884* 10 STIP MOT/for continuance of Hrg on Certification of issue to Utah Supreme Crt
111 ORDER BSJ 5/20/88 continuing hrg on Mot/to Certify to 6/8/88 at 1:30 P.M. cc: attys
./88ni* 12 NOTICE of Appear by Daniel M. Allred, Esq. for defs
/88ml 13 NOTICE of W/drawal of csl by Paul A. Kirk, Esq. as csl for defs
'88rorf 14

88mw

$8cn

PLTF's Mot/Partial Sumn. Judgnt.

15

PLTF's Memo In Suppt of Doc #14

16

AFF of Barry Bryner

17

DEF's Notice of filing of certain pleadings from related state court action

18

AFF of Sharon Esplin

19

DEF's Notice of w/drawal of Memo In suppt of Mot/to Dism

20

AFF of Paul M. Warner

21

DEFS1 Memo re: And. Certification Order

22

DEFS1 Answer

23

Came before the court on not/consider form of order. D e f s cnsl states he wants
this action dism w/prej, however, cnsl also requests sch conf, the filing of
findings of fact & conclusions of law and resolving the issue as to whether
this matter should be certified to the Utah Supreme Court. Pltfs filed mot/sunm /
jdgmt St feels there is no need for disc. Court states pltfs mot/summ jdgmt
^
will be set to be heard in due course. Defs cnsl represents to court that they
are not interested at this time in certifying this matter to the Utah State
Supreme Court. Court set disc cut-off date - 9-9-88; post disc motions to be
filed by 9-26-88 & motions to be heard by 10-21-88. Final pretrial conf set
for 10-28-88 at 1:30 p.m. Sch order to be prepared by Mr. Eckersley
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6/10/88m* 24 NOTICE of Hrg on Pltfs Mot/Parial Surom Judgnt set for 7/15/88 at 8:30 A.M.
cc: attys
6/10/88nto 25 PEF's Amd. Answer
6/15/88mL 26
7/14/88r(w 27

STIP/for continuance of Hrg on Pltf 's Mot/SJ from 7/15/88 to 8/10/88 @8:30 A.M.
SO ORDERED BSJ 6/17/88 cc: attys
DEFS' Mot/Summ. Judgmt.

28 DEFS' Memo In Oppos to Pltfs Mot/Partial SJ & in Suppt of Their Mot/SJ
29 AFF of Lee Semken
30 AFF of Daniel M. Allxed
31 DEFS' Cert of Svc of 1st Req/Prod
7/20/88m| 32
8/4/88nJ

33

NOTICE OF Hrg on Defs' Mot/SJ set for 8/10/88 at 8:30 A.M. cc; attys
PLTFS' Reply Memo in Suppt of Pltfs Mot/for Sumnru Judgnt. & in Oppos to Defs1
Mot/for SJ

34 NOTICE of change of Address of M. David Eckersleyr Esq.
8/8/88nrt

35

STIP/ORDER BSJ 8/3/88 allowing defs to 7/15/88 to file Memo In Cppo to Pltfs
Mot/SJ & Pltfs have to 8/3/88 to file Reply cc: attys

8/9/88nJ

36

STIP/ORDER BSJ 8/8/88 continuing hrg on Mots/SJ to 8/30/88 at 8:30 A.M. cc: attys

8/15/88mL 37

DEFS1 Reply Memo In Suppt of Mot/for Partial SJ

J/19/88mj 38

PLTF's Mot/for Protective Order & Supptg Menu

3/19/88ml 39

DEF's Mot/to Conpel Disc & Supptg Memo

40

DEF's Notice of Depo of Bill Flink, 8/19/88

l/22/88m^ 41

DEF's Notice of Depo,of Barry Bryner, 8/25/88; Tina McCourt, 8/25/88; Jeral Cowan
8/25/88; Barbara Kelly, 8/25/88

l/22/88n*| 42

RETN/subp on Bill Flink, 8/19/88

B/24/88nJv 43

DEF's Notice of Depo of Lyla Grogan, 8/26/88; Sheriff Joe Gonzales, 8/26/88

J/30/88 lc 44 Came Before Crt for Defs Motion for Sum/Jdgmt; Pltfs Mot for Sum/Jdgmt
and Defs Mot to Conpel. Arguments heard. The Court, with reference to
qualified inrnunity, GRANTED the notion as far as the Corrndssioners are
concerned. The Court RESERVED on remaining notions.
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DOCKET NO.
PAGE

l/88n|w 45
46
47
I8mw

48

88nw

.PAGES

(

PROCEEDINGS

NR.

nx

OF_

DBFS' Addl Statement of Facts In Oppos to Pltf's Mot/for Partial Summ. Judgnt.
STIP/regarding Depositions, ORDERED BSJ 9/2/88 Court nay rely on unsigned copies df
depos re: Mots/Partial SJ & sealing identity of Informant #4 cc: attys
DEF's And. Mot/to Conpel Disc
RETN/subp on Barbara Kelly, 8/23/88; Barry Bryner, 8/23/88; Jeral Cowen, 8/23/88
[DEPOSITION OF KATOY ANN ANDERSON, 8/25/88

(
DEPOSITION OF JERRY COWAN 8/25/88
DEPOSITION OF JOSEPH T. GONZALES, 8/25/88
DEPOSITION OF BARBARA M. KELLEY, 8/25/88
DEPOSITION OF MM. L. FLINK, 8/19/88
f8Ski>

49

'89m* 50

Came before the court on 8/22/88 on a mot/carpel disc. Args of counsel were hrd
a discussion was held. Court indicated to counsel that it cannot make a prematur^
ruling at this point. Counsel nay proceed with the taking of the depos. If the
matters cannot be resolved, Court will hear apprqp mots of counsel.
STIP/MOT/ORDER BSJ 9/2/88 extending disc cutoff tO 10/21/88, Post Disc Mots due 9/|26/88
to be hrd by 10/21/88, Final PT set for LO/28/88 @1:30 P.M. cc: Attys

>-89 |sw 5l| NOTICE Re: Status & Sched Conf set for 8/10/89 @ 1:30 PM

'89kJ 52
89kd

53

Stat rpt hid.

Cross nots/SJ pendg.

cc: cnsl

S & S conf set for 9/20, 1:30 P.M.

S & S conf hid. Cnsl to start cert of ques for Supreme Crt.
1:30 P.M. (RF, CR)

(RF, CR)

Hrg set for 10/17/89

7/89hw

DEPOSITION OF INFORMENT NO. 4 - SEALED

/89kk 54

Stat rpt hid. Cnsl to start by Eri a final doc, signed by all cnsl, containing
the ques to be certified. (RF, CR)
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